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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE STEVEN CONDIE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 16646 
DR. ROBERT L. YOUNGBLOOD, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from an Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge. 
David w. Slagle, of 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
Thom D. Roberts, of 
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
NATURE OF CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT . 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL • • • • • 4 
POINT II: THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
UPON THE GROUNDS URGED BY THE DEFENDANT 6 
CONCLUSION • • 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah, 1969). 
Heath v. Mower, 597 F.2d 855 (Utah, 1979). 
Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322 .•••••. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Company, 376 P.2d 951 • 
Utah Oil company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1977) 
Vealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah, 1978) 
78-12-28 
78-12-35 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act 
78-14-8. 
78-14-11 
• 11 
8 
5 
6 
4 
10,11 
9 
8 
8 
9 
9,10 
9,10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
defendant's Motion to Dismiss and remand with instructions for the 
defendant to file a responsive pleading to plaintiff's Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was injured in a motorcycle accident on August 
7, 1974. He was hospitalized with the defendant and another doctor 
as treating physicians. During the course of the treatment, decub-
itus ulcers were developed by the plaintiff. Plaintiff continued 
after his release to be treated by defendant and continued having 
problems with the decubitus ulcers. In September, 1975, plaintiff 
was hospitalized by the defendant, and during the course of said 
hospitalization, it was discovered that plaintiff had developed 
osteomyelitis. Two years later as a result of the osteomyelitis, 
the plaintiff had his right leg amputated. 
Plaintiff filed suit against the hospital and later 
against this defendant for the negligent diagnosis and treatment. 
Suit was filed against the hospital in October, 1975 and against 
this defendant on September 15, 1977. In the summer of 1978, the 
lawsuit was settled as against the hospital. Summons for thepres~t 
Complaint was placed in the hands of the process server within thre 
months of its filing. (See Affidavit of Don Hammill) Summons and 
Complaint were subsequently served on this defendant on September 
14, 1978. 
Plaintiff had been represented by two attorneys, who 
shortly after the service of the Summons and Complaint, had both 
withdrawn as counsel by sending notice to the Court, counsel for 
the defendant and plaintiff. 
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-On January 12, 1979, respondent's attorney mailed to 
the appellant a notice requiring the appellant to appoint another 
attorney or to appear in person. Appellant received this notice 
and was in the process of contacting other lawyers. On February 
1, 1979, respondent's attorney mailed a Notice of Hearing regard-
ing his Motion to Dismiss to the appellant at the address listed 
on the Complaint and Sununons. No other notice of said Motion was 
mailed to any other person. The appellant never received, nor 
did appellant have knowledge of said Notice, nor of the hearing 
date. (See Affidavit of Appellant) Said Notice was sent, certified, 
return receipt requested. The return was signed by an individual 
not the plaintiff. (See exhibit attached to Affidavit of respondent's 
attorney) 
On February 13, 1979, hearing was held on respondent's 
Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss. Respondent appeared through counsel, 
and appellant neither appeared in person nor through counsel. At 
said hearing, the Judgment of Dismissal was granted. Counsel for 
the respondent then mailed a copy of the Judgment to the appellant, 
not by certified mail, but the appellant never received nor had 
notice of said entry of Judgment. 
Appellant then obtained the services of his present 
attorney who, upon reading the Court file, discovered the Judgment 
of Dismissal and informed appellant of the same and moved to set 
aside the Judgment of Dismissal and filed supporting Affidavits 
signed by the appellant. Hearing was held on said Motion, and the 
Motion was denied by Judge Wilkinson by Order signed and dated 
July 30, 1979. Notice of Appeal from said decision was duly and 
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timely filed on August 27, 1979. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL. 
Appellant urges three reasons why it was an abuse of 
discretion for the District Court to refuse to set aside the Judg· 
ment of Dismissal: 
1. That the appellant never had notice of the hearing. 
2. That the notice was improper. 
3. That the defendant was not entitled to his Judgment 
of Dismissal. 
The question of whether or not to grant relief or to 
otherwise set aside a Judgment, is largely a matter of discretion 
for the Trial Court. However, such discretion is not unbounded, 
and there is a policy in the law that disfavors the granting of 
Default Judgments. As stated in Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite 
Compqny, 376 P.2d 951 at Page 952: 
"It is undoubtedly correct that the trial court is 
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in grant-
ing or denying slx:h rotions. However, it is also true 
that the court cannot act arbitrarily in that regard, but 
sOOul.d be generally indulgent toward pennitting full in-
quiry and knCMledge of disputes so they can be settled 
advisedly and in conformity with law and justice. To 
claltp a judgnent ridigly and irrevocably on a party 
without a hearing is obviously a hard and oppressive 
thing. It is fundanental in our systan of justice that 
each party to a controversy should be afforded an oppor-
tunity to present his side of the case. For that reason 
it is quite uniformly regarded as an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to vacate a default judgment \\here there is 
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to appear, and tirrely application is made to set 
it aside." 
-4-
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These principles have been continued to be upheld by this Court. 
Cf. Heath v. Mower, 597 F.2d 855 (Utah, 1979). 
In the case at bar, plaintiff has tendered a reasonable 
excuse of his non-appearance and failure to attend the hearing. 
As stated in his Affidavit, he was, during this period of time, 
attempting to obtain new counsel; that the address the notice 
was mailed to was that of his estranged wife; that in the month 
of January, he was not residing at the address, and that du.ring 
February, he was hospitalized. It is also his sworn statement 
that he never received notice of the hearing. Further, defendant's 
attempt to insure personal receipt of the notice by certified mail 
rendered a receipt of the notice by some other individual than the 
plaintiff. 
The statutes of the State of Utah have addressed them-
selves to the problems and procedures of withdrawal and substitution 
of counsel and proceedings after notice of withdrawal. As stated 
in 1953, U.C.A., §78-51-35, it states: 
"When an attorney is changed as provided in the next 
preceding section [filing notice of witMrawal with the 
court), written notice of the change and substitution of 
a new attorney or of the appearance of the party in person 
ITUlSt be given to the adverse party; until then he ITUlSt 
recognize the fonner attorney." 
It would appear that the above quoted section was passed 
in order to protect litigants of what transpired here. The statute 
dictates that until such time as the opposing litigant obtains a 
new attorney and the court and parties are advised of that fact, 
or that he enters his appearance pro se indicating his willingness 
to represent himself, his opponents and attorney must still recognize 
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the former attorney as counsel of record and thus provide him with 
notice of any and all motions and hearings. This would insure that 
notice would be actually received and responded to and help enable 
the litigant whose attorney has withdrawn to state his need for 
more time or his position. 
Although not dispositive, the Trial Court should look 
to the proposed defense or claim of the individual to determine 
if there is just cause for the setting aside of the Default Judg-
ment. This was recognized in Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322 at 
Page 1323: 
"'lbmefore, notwithstanding the rule of liberality 
in granting notions to set aside judgments in appro-
priate circumstances, that should not be done unless 
tbe m:wing party tenders the defense of sufficient irerit 
to justify that procedure. This leads us to a oonsid-
eraticn of the principal issue in this case: whether 
the defendant did tender a ireritorious defense." 
This issue is discussed in the following second point. 
It is there contended that as a matter of law, the defendant was 
not entitled to a Judgment of Dismissal, and that as a matter of 
law, those defenses should have been overruled. Such point is 
appropriate to this argument in that the plaintiff does have a 
meritorious response to the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant. 
POINT II: THAT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUDGMENT OF DIS-
MISSAL UPON THE GROUNDS URGED BY THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The defendant in his Motion to Quash and/or Dismiss the 
plaintiff's Complaint, asserted four grounds which will be treated 
serially in this argument. Those grounds were: (1) improper servi 
of Sununons and Complaint; (2} action is barred by the statute of 
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limitations, (3) failure to allege compliance with the Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act, and (4) failure to obtain an attorney pur-
suant to local Court rules. 
Defendant's first ground for dismissal was that the 
summons and Complaint were not served in compliance with Rule 
4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule requires that 
Summons must issue upon a Complaint within three months from the 
date of filing of the Complaint, and that the Summons must, in 
any event, be served within one year after the filing of the 
Complaint, or the action will be dismissed. Affidavits were 
submitted prior to the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss which 
stated that the Summons and Complaint had been placed in the hands 
of a process server within three months of filing (See Affidavit 
of Don Hammill). Further the Affidavit of service recites that 
the Summons and Complaint were served on September 14, 1978 within 
one year of the filing of the Complaint. Thus, it would appear 
the service complied with the rules. 
There was some argument made by counsel for the defendant 
at the hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Judgment that the Summons 
and Complaint served on the defendant were different than the 
Summons and complaint which were filed initially. However, there 
is no evidence that in the material allegations or the prayer of 
the complaint that there was any difference between the Complaints. 
Further,the rules provide, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 4(h), 
that process or proof of service thereof may be amended unless it 
appears prejudicial. There being no material difference in the 
Complaint served upon the defendant, there cannot be any prejudice 
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to the defendant which would affect his substantial rights. 
The second defense asserted by the defendant was that 
the action is barred by the statute of limitations. This defense 
is a factual defense based upon the circumstances of each individua; 
case. The applicable statute containing the statute of limitations 
at the time of the acts complained of, was contained in 19 5 3, U. C .A. 
§78-12-28 and allowed for a two year statute of limitations. This 
statute of limitations had been construed to mean that the statute 
of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff knew, or 
should have known, of the cause of action. Christiansen v. Rees, 
436 P.2d 435 (Utah, 1969). Further, for any period of time the 
defendant is without the State of Utah, such period of time is 
not part of the time period for computation of the statute of 
limitations. 1953, U.C.A. §78-12-35. 
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense--
one to be pleaded and proved by the defendant. It also requires 
a factual hearing and decision. In this case, there is an allegati~ 
of continuing negligence on the part of the defendant, and thus, 
the commencement period would be a question of fact. Also, any 
absence by the defendant would toll the statute. At the hearing, 
it was argued by counsel for the defendant that the statute of 
limitations began to run on September 6, 1975, the day the plaintifl 
entered the hospital, and that thus, the Complaint was filed nine 
days too late. Plaintiff objects to the unsupported conclusion 
that September 6, 1975 was the day the statute commenced to run, 
and further believes that evidence would demonstrate an absence of 
greater than nine days on the part of the defendant during the peri~1. 
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Thus, it is the position of the plaintiff that dismissal 
based upon the state of the pleadings and the lack of evidence 
before the Court makes dismissal on the grounds of being barred 
by the statute of limitations improper at this time. 
The third defense raised is the failure to allege compliance 
with the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. It is the position of 
the plaintiff that the provisions of the Utah Health Care Malpractice 
Act do not apply to this case. 
The actions of the defendant and injuries occurred are 
alleged to have happened during and prior to 1975. The Utah Health 
Care Malpractice Act became effective 60 days after adjournment 
of the Utah State Legislature on January 31, 1976. As such, it 
did not apply tothis injury and cause of action. The defendant's 
concern is that the plaintiff did not file a Notice of Intention 
to Commence an Action, pursuant to the provisions of §78-14-8. The 
Act in its own terms would indicate that this section is not to be 
applied retroactively. The last section of the Act, §78-14-11 states: 
"The provisions of this act, with the exception 
of the provisions relating to the limitation on the 
time for camencing an action, shall not apply to 
injuries, death or services rendered which occurred 
prior to the effective date of this act." 
The limitation period set forth in the Health Care Malpractice Act 
is in section 78-14-4. 
In ~ealey v. Clegg, 579 P.2d 919 (Utah, 1978), this 
Court upheld the dismissal of a malpractice action for failure to 
give the required 90 day notice. Also in that case, the cause of 
action arose prior to the effective date of this Act. It is urged 
by this plaintiff that that case failed to take into account Section 
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11 of the Health Care Malpractice Act and failed to adequately 
ascertain the legislative intent with regard to the retroactivity 
of the statute. 
As mentioned previously, that last section of the Act 
provides that the Act shall not be retroactive, except for the two 
year period of limitations for filing an action. After the decisior 
in the Vealey case, the legislature amended Section 8 of the Health 
Care Malpractice Act by adding an an additional paragraph which 
stated: 
"This sectian shall, for purposes of detennining its 
retroactivity, not be oonstrued as relating to the 
Umitation on time for cx:mrencing any action, and shall 
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 
1, 1976." 
Thus, the Utah Legislature overruled the decision in 
Vealey in a manner expressing that the legislative intent always 
was the notice of intention to commence the action does not bear 
upon the limitation of time in commencing an action, and thus, 
pursuant to the final section of the Act, is not to be held to be 
retroactive. 
The last ground for dismissal alleged by the defendant 
was failure to obtain an attorney, pursuant to local Court rules 
and notice requiring appointment. This, by itself, is not sufficieni 
to allow dismissal and survive a Motion to Set Aside Judgment. In 
Utah Oil Company v. Harris, 565 P.2d 1135 (Utah, 1977), the case 
was dismissed at the Trial court level with prejudice for plaintiff' 
failure to appoint a new attorney and failure to diligently prosecut 
The Supreme Court there reversed the dismissal. 
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In Utah Oil, supra, in arriving at the decision, the 
Court first quoted, 1953, U.C.A., §78-51-36, Notice to appoint 
successor, The Court then stated at Page 1136: 
"The foregoing clearly appears to have been enacted 
to safeguard a litigant who finds himself without counsel 
and prevents further proceedings until he again has counsel 
or chcx:>ses to proceed pro se. It is not a 'court' directive 
nor does it exact a:ey penalty against the litigant who fails 
for one reason or another to engage new counsel since, by 
its own te?lns, it affords him the 'altexnative' of appear-
ing in person. Consequently, 1'hlen a litigant does fail to 
engage new oounsel, that, in and of itself, is not an adequate 
basis to default him or to disniss as against him with prejudice." 
Local Court rule 2.5 also tracts the statute that is 
set forth in the discussion under Point I and states: 
"When an attomey dies or is rerroved or suspended or 
withdraws fran the case or ceases to act as an attomey, 
the party to an action for whan such attomey was acting, 
must before any further proceedings are had against him, 
be required by the adverse party, by written notice to 
appoint another attomey or to appear in person." 
The thrust of the rule would appear to require either 
the appointment of another attorney or an appearance pro se before 
further hearings can be had. This, of course, would include the 
hearing here in question when the plaintiff did not appear, either 
personally or through counsel and Judgment was granted against him. 
CONCLUSION 
The state of the record, therefore, clearly demonstrates 
that it was an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court to not set 
aside the Judgment of Dismissal entered against the plaintiff. This, 
because of the timely application of the plaintiff after learning of 
the entry of the Order of Dismissal and the reasonable grounds and 
excuses which he gave for his failure to appear and defend the Motion 
for Dismissal. This case should, therefore, be remanded for District 
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Court, at a minimum for the Order of Dismissal to be set aside, 
and the plaintiff be granted an opportunity to fully answer and 
respond to the grounds alleged for dismissal. 
It is also urged by the plaintiff-appellant that based 
upon the state of the record, it is clear that the defendant, as 
a matter of law, is not entitled to a Judgment of Dismissal of 
plaintiff's cause of action. Further, it is the position of the 
plaintiff that as a matter of law, the defendant's grounds for 
dismissal be overruled and found against him with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1979. 
ROBERTS, BLACK & DIBBLEE 
By 
=T~h-o-m---=D~.---.R~o~bre~r~t-s~~~~~~~~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to Mr. David w. Slage, Attorney 
for Defendant, 700 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, this day of November, 1979. 
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